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On September 21, 1849, a slave named Mary left her 
quarters alone and in secret, found a place out of her 
master’s sight, and gave birth to a male child. After 
she had delivered her son, whom the coroner later 
characterized as having been born alive, healthy, and 
“in the peace of God and the state,” Mary assaulted 
her infant, killing him instantly. Later, after the child 
was discovered, Mary was arrested and indicted for 
infanticide. The indictment charged that she, the slave 
of Jesse Rankin, had “bestowed mortal wounds” onto 
her child by kicking and beating it with “both her hands 
and feet.” She continued to inflict harm by casting 
and throwing the newborn “against the ground” 
and repeatedly injuring his “head, temples, throat, 
wind pipe, stomach and back.” The indictment read 
that Mary did “kill and murder against the peace and 
dignity of the state.”1
Despite the evidence presented against Mary, the 
North Carolina Superior Court found her “not guilty,” 
freeing her of all charges and permitting her to return 
to her master’s farm. The court’s decision in this case 
mirrored the experience of many women who were 
1 State v Mary (a slave), Fall 1849, Davidson County Criminal 
Action Concerning Slaves 1840, 1843, 1844, North Carolina, 
CR.032 .928.9, North Carolina Department of A rchives and 
Histor y (NCDA H).
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charged with infanticide in the nineteenth-century American South. 
Even when the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to secure a guilty 
verdict, courts repeatedly found women not guilty of infanticide.
Nineteenth-century conceptions of gender, race, and condition of 
servitude pervaded the legal system and shaped court rulings. Infanticide 
cases are revelatory sources for understanding race and gender in the 
antebellum era. Infanticide was legally defined as a crime that could 
only be perpetrated by women. Nineteenth-century infanticide cases 
therefore highlight the roles that women were expected to perform and 
provide rare instances of women transcending race and legal status in 
the South. This article argues that infanticide cases in the South allowed 
women to transcend societal limitations even as they reinforced gendered 
expectations of southern women. Such cases illuminate contradictions 
within southern patriarchy and the institution of slavery.
Infanticide cases in North Carolina illuminate the intersection of race, 
gender, slavery, patriarchy, and the law. Historians have studied infanticide 
in the South, but primarily in the eighteenth century. One of the earliest 
works on this subject was Peter Hoffer and N.E. Hull’s study of infanticide 
in New England between 1558 and 1803, in which the authors analyzed data 
in order to understand the dynamics that caused women to murder their 
own children. In searching for those influences, Hoffer and Hull strove to 
understand why courts acquitted more women in the eighteenth century 
than they had in earlier periods. The authors believed that intricacies of 
the law could explain these changes and did not pay much attention to the 
women themselves.2 An analysis of nineteenth-century cases in the South 
shows that the pattern of acquittal outlined by Hoffer and Hull continued 
into the nineteenth century and was not confined to northern states.
More recent scholarship has situated infanticide within the broad 
development of social constructs. In Narrating Infanticide: Constructing 
the Modern Gendered State in Nineteenth-Century America, Felicity Turner 
argues that infanticide narratives were critical to the formation of ideas 
2 See Peter Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and New 
England 1558-1803 (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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regarding gender in the nineteenth century.3 A detailed examination of 
southern infanticide cases, however, shows that infanticide narratives, 
in conjunction with courts’ decisions, did not help form new ideas about 
race and gender, but reinforced existing notions. In the nineteenth century, 
southerners had already formed strong opinions about race and gender, 
as many historians have shown. Indeed, as early as the late seventeenth 
century, supporters of slavery had used conceptions of race to support and 
justify bondage. By the same token, the definition and responsibilities of 
motherhood and womanhood had been firmly established in the South 
before the turn of the nineteenth century.
By the nineteenth century, the “peculiar institution” of slavery was 
deeply embedded in the South’s way of life. Many scholars have discussed 
the experiences and distinct vulnerability of enslaved women in the 
South, who were subjected to the most inhumane treatments, including 
sexual exploitation, psychological abuse, and physical mistreatment. 
Furthermore, these women’s legal status limited their social mobility, 
3 Felicity Turner, Narrating Infanticide: Constructing the Modern Gendered State in 
Nineteenth-Century America (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010). For more 
recent scholarship on gender and race in the nineteenth-centur y A merican South, see 
Wilma K ing, “‘Mad ’ Enough to K ill: Enslaved Women, Murder, and Southern Courts” In 
The Journal of Afr ican American History 92, no. 1 (Winter, 2007): 37-56.
The Modern Medea, a wood engraving of an enslaved woman who killed two of her 
four children to prevent them from living through the horrors of slavery. This 
was a common motivation for enslaved women who committed infanticide 
in the nineteenth century. (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress.)
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the customs they adopted, and the ways in which they interacted with 
one another.4 Analysis of infanticide cases, in which enslaved women 
served as defendants, can demonstrate how these women drew upon their 
experiences to help them make choices in order to survive the depredations 
of “the peculiar institution.”
Infanticide cases also shed light on white women’s experiences in the 
nineteenth-century South. Many historians have discussed white women’s 
limited political and social power in the antebellum South, demonstrating 
that their rights and capabilities were solidified through marriage and 
their husband’s political and social power.5 White women’s experiences 
can be further understood through the analysis of infanticide narratives 
formulated through witness testimonies, infanticide court documents, 
newspaper articles, and writings by nineteenth-century intellectuals. 
These findings complicate modern ideas about women’s associations to 
slavery. Whereas some scholars have drawn a firm line between the daily 
lives of black and white women in the antebellum South, an examination 
of infanticide cases blurs that line due to similarities in the treatment of 
black and white women in North Carolina’s superior courts. Whether white 
or black, southern women were held to high standards of motherhood, 
making infanticide a highly gendered act that could transcend racial lines.
Court officials were reluctant to convict women for infanticide even 
when there was often satisfactory evidence to convict. The regularity 
of “not guilty” verdicts in these cases shows that factors outside the law 
influenced the court’s decisions to acquit women. In analyzing such 
verdicts, this article reveals that southern courts were pressured to make 
decisions that upheld entrenched southern social norms, the system of 
slavery, the patriarchal system, and conservative ideas of womanhood and 
motherhood. These findings expand on previous scholarship of women’s 
4 For research on the experiences of enslaved people in the antebellum South, see Walter 
Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Har vard University Press, 1999), 34-42; Eugene Genovese, Roll , Jordan, Roll: The World 
the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1976); and John W. Blassingame, The Slave 
Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979). For experiences of enslaved women on the plantation, see Deborah White Ar’n’t I 
a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South ( New York: Norton, 1999) and Marie 
Jenkins Schwarz, Birthing a Slave: Motherhood and Medicine in the Antebellum South 
(Cambridge Mass.: Har vard Press, 2009).
5 See Laura Edwards, People and their Peace; Nancy Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship in 
Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Clara Lyons, 
Sex among the Rabble: An Intimate History of Gender and Power in the Age of Revolution , 
Pennsylvania 1730-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
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experiences in the nineteenth century and show how ideas surrounding 
slavery and patriarchy were woven into the South’s social, political, and legal 
fabric, shaping women’s choices and experiences in the nineteenth century.
Understanding Women’s Motives
In the nineteenth century, certain groups saw infanticide as a crime that 
could be shaped to serve their own political interests. Abolitionists and 
supporters of slavery alike understood that infanticide was an ideological 
issue that could be framed to reinforce their positions on the institution 
of slavery. In the North, they believed that women were motivated to 
commit infanticide by outside social and personal conditions. Therefore, 
the women’s social circumstances often determined whether or not they 
garnered the sympathy of the court. For example, Northern abolitionists 
sympathized with enslaved women who committed infanticide in the 
South because they believed that the institution of slavery had forced 
these women into a position in which infanticide was the only option, thus 
demonstrating the extreme conditions of enslaved peoples. In the South, 
on the other hand, the press often used instances of infanticide as proof of 
black moral and psychological inferiority, using the cases to justify slavery 
instead of rejecting it.
Reports on infanticide in the antebellum South also reinforced the 
definition of motherhood and womanhood—namely, the idea that it was 
women’s responsibility to care for children. Sociologist Marci Littlefield 
claims that the years 1820 to 1860 represent the “cult of the womanhood,” 
a distinct period in which motherhood was the supreme moral role for 
women. Therefore, when an infant was found dead, southerners concluded 
without much evidence that the mother was responsible for killing the 
child, regardless of intent, because it was her responsibility to take care for 
it.6 Men were rarely indicted for infanticide. Even when men were indicted, 
newspapers shaped the narrative in a way that justified the man’s actions or 
suggested male innocence in some way. Infanticide was viewed not only as 
a racial crime but also a gendered one. Infanticide was deemed a rejection 
of one’s womanly duty and, therefore, an “unnatural” act.7
6 Marci Bounds Littlef ield, “Black Women, Mothering, and Protest in the 19 th centur y 
A merican Society,” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 2, no. 1 (November 2007): 53-61 .
7 Edward Pessen, "How Different from Each Other were the North and the South?" 
American Historical Review 85, no. 5 (1980): 1123; Turner, Narrating Infanticide, 104.
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These diverse social and political perceptions of infanticide point to 
the specific social positions of enslaved and white women in the antebellum 
South. North Carolina infanticide cases show that the patriarchal system 
and the southern definition of womanhood forced black and white 
women into similar situations in which infanticide seemed necessary or 
appropriate. The women who appeared in North Carolina courts for this 
crime understood the limits of their power under the systems of patriarchy 
and slavery. These restrictions are one explanation for infanticide: women 
did not want their children to be subjected to the cruel and inhumane 
experiences that they had been forced to endure. These women did not 
want to raise a child who would be equally powerless and unable to change 
their position in society. They felt infanticide was their only choice.
During the nineteenth century, the Southern understanding of 
womanhood did not apply to enslaved women. In southern states, many 
whites defined a true woman as one who was virtuous and moral, but in a 
way that was identified with whiteness. Southern whites viewed enslaved 
women as property, making them doubly vulnerable and disadvantaged 
in courts. Free women of color who appeared in the courts for infanticide 
were similarly limited in their mobility and political power.
Although white women had more social mobility and freedom than 
enslaved women, white defendants in these cases in North Carolina were 
usually poor, which similarly limited their social power. Like enslaved 
women and free women of color, these white women were socially 
and politically handicapped, restricted as they were by their economic 
circumstances. Yet, unlike black defendants, traditional visions of 
womanhood applied more readily to the white women and thus posed 
distinct challenges to these notions of proper femininity.
In the nineteenth century, pregnancy presented a host of problems 
for single women in the South. All women, despite their social standing 
and race, were responsible for taking care of their children during this 
era. However, vital differences based on race, and legal and social status 
existed, affecting women’s motivations for committing infanticide. Free 
women charged with infanticide were generally young, single servants 
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who concealed their pregnancies throughout the entire term.8 For enslaved 
women, child-bearing and pregnancy had a unique implication: exposing 
their children to slavery and its associated physical and psychological 
abuse. Many enslaved women felt that it was their obligation to protect 
their children from these traumas. Free women of color were similarly 
economically handicapped, discriminated against, and subjected to harsh 
treatments due to their racial status, which resulted in similar motivations 
for infanticide despite these women’s legal status.9
While most white women charged with infanticide lacked this 
motivation, their lack of social and political mobility in southern society 
could pose other problems. In her discussion of sex in antebellum America, 
Nancy Isenberg argues that white women were “aliens” in the antebellum 
South because their citizenship was defined by their husbands’. According 
to Isenberg, white women in the South did not have the ability to control 
and secure their child’s health, disclose their opinions on the raising of the 
child, or control their own lives—even in terms of childbearing. Women 
who became pregnant out of wedlock exacerbated these gendered concerns. 
For Elizabeth Beaver, Sally Paul, Patience Rye, Nancy Trimble, all poor 
white single women indicted for infanticide in antebellum North Carolina, 
a bastard child presented a series of issues for them. An illegitimate child 
could tarnish the woman’s reputation, due to a general scorn for bastardy, 
and become an additional financial burden for poor white women.10
Openly giving birth to and raising a child was simply not an option 
for many enslaved women, freed women of color, or white women in the 
nineteenth-century South. Despite differences in legal status and race, 
most southern women had similar motivations for committing infanticide. 
Enslaved women were motivated to kill their children because of their 
experiences in slavery. Freed women of color similarly were pushed to 
kill their children for reasons of racial discrimination. White women did 
so in an attempt to conform to the idea of a true southern woman and to 
8 King v Allerton , 1761, New Jersey Supreme Court Case, number 20303, New Jersey 
State A rchives (NJDSA); State v Elizabeth Beaver, May 1811, Caswell County Criminal 
Action Papers 1810-1811, NCDA H; State v Rianna Day, March Term 1849, Orange County 
Criminal Action papers 1848-1849 CR 073.326.48, folder labeled: 1849, NCDA H. This was 
an inquest initiated by Will iam New and David A nderson.
9 Felicity Turner, Narrating Infanticide: Constructing the Modern Gendered State in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 82 .
10 Nancy Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998), 147-148.
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rid themselves of a financial burden. Infanticide therefore linked the 
most oppressed persons under slavery and patriarchy in the nineteenth 
century. But despite the pervasiveness of slavery and patriarchy, black and 
white women were consistently found “not guilty” for infanticide despite 
overwhelming evidence that appeared to prove their guilt. In the legal 
arena, these women were uniquely able to transcend widespread limitations 
that affected women across the South.
Five generations of slaves in Beaufort, South Carolina. Since slavery was an inherited status in the 
nineteenth-century South, many enslaved women committed infanticide so that their children 
would not have to endure the horrors of slavery. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress.)
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Understanding Infanticide Through the Law
Infanticide cases were unique among murder trials in the nineteenth 
century. Prosecutors had to prove three conditions before the jury could 
issue a guilty verdict: that the defendant was the mother of the child, that 
the child was born alive, and that the mother committed the crime. Whereas 
homicide defendants only received the death penalty in certain cases, the 
punishment for infanticide in North Carolina was death by hanging.
Identifying the mother was generally not a difficult task. Women 
sometimes confessed to bearing the child, as was the case with Charity, a 
slave from Orange County.11 In other cases, jurors and the courts identified 
the mother through the help of other witnesses, usually other women who 
had daily interactions with the defendant. These women would examine 
the suspected mothers, usually by squeezing their breast to produce milk, 
which demonstrated that the woman had borne a child. The defense counsel 
rarely made arguments against such claims.12 In contrast, determining 
whether or not the baby was born alive and if the defendant committed the 
crime was much harder to prove given the defendants’ tendency to conceal 
their pregnancy and give birth in secret.
Legal definitions of infanticide in the United States originated in the 
early British legal tradition. In the seventeenth century, British courts 
categorized infanticide as murder, defining it as a crime in which a person 
of a sound mind “and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature 
in being and under the King’s Peace with malice aforethought.” However, 
infanticide had one additional characteristic that set it apart from other 
11 State v Charity (a slave), September 2, 1830, Orange County Slave Records no date, 
1783-1865 broken series, folder labeled: 1825-1841, CR 073.928.8, Orange County 
Miscellaneous Records, NCDA H. For infanticide cases where an enslaved woman 
admitted to being the mother, see State v Hannah , evidence of Thomas Barnett, March 
term 1836, Criminal Actions Concerning Slaves and Free Person of Color 1820-1837, 
folder: State v. Hannah (a slave of Col . John G Hart) 1836, CR 044 928.16, NCDA H; 
and State v Sarah (a slave) December 1819, Criminal Action Papers 1820-1821 Orange 
County, North Carolina NCDA H. For a case where a white woman admitted to being 
the mother, see State v Hannah Walker, testimony of Pegg y, November 25, 1821 Orange 
County Criminal Action Papers 1820-1821, CR 073 326.20, folder labeled: 1821, NCDA H; 
and State v Jef fer ies and Betsy Combs, November 1818, Criminal Action Papers, Caswell 
County (NCDA H).
12 State v Esther (a slave), fal l term 1833, Records concerning slaves and free persons of 
color, NDA H. For two infanticide cases where enslaved women did not admit to having 
their child, see State v Sarah (a slave) December 1819, criminal action papers, Orange 
county, folder labeled: 1820, (NCDA H). In the sources for this article, most enslaved 
women and free white women of color initially denied being the mother, but later folded 
under questioning.
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forms of murder: the act of concealing the death of a bastard child was 
considered conclusive evidence that the child was born alive and that the 
mother was guilty as charged of killing the infant. The British Parliament 
made the act of concealing a (lifeless or living) child illegal and punishable 
by death in 1624, when it passed a statute known as the Jacobian law, 
which stated that a dead child was evidence of a woman’s engagement in 
premarital sex, an act that was punishable by law.13
Though much of the American legislation on infanticide was taken 
from the British tradition, in nineteenth-century North Carolina the 
prosecution did have to prove that the mother intentionally committed 
murder and had not simply concealed a stillbirth. First, for the crime to be 
considered infanticide, the court had to provide evidence that the mother 
had a sound mind when she committed this act, by proving her ability to 
discern between “good” and “evil.” Furthermore, the killing had to be 
considered “unlawful,” meaning that the mother killed the child without 
“warrant or excuses.” Therefore, it was imperative to discern whether 
the child was born alive or dead, especially after states did away with the 
Jacobian Law. In 1818, North Carolina deviated from the Jacobian Law, 
determining that the concealment of a deceased child would no longer 
serve as conclusive evidence to convict a mother of infanticide. The court 
ruled that the act of concealing a stillbirth would thereafter only be 
considered a misdemeanor.14
In the nineteenth century, infant mortality by natural causes was 
common, making infanticide even more difficult to prove. Infant death 
was assumed to be from natural causes, for example from exposure or 
injury during childbirth, until evidence was brought to a court suggesting 
otherwise. Therefore, in cases of infanticide, the proof of the child’s 
livebirth fell entirely on the prosecution. Proving that the child was born 
alive was the hardest task because of the secrecy surrounding most relevant 
births. In rare cases, such as State v Charity, the prosecution skipped over 
this step. David Craig, Charity’s master, explained to the court that the 
13 Will iam Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries: with notes of reference, to the constitution 
and laws, of the federal government of the United States; and of the commonwealth of 
Virginia. In f ive volumes. With an appendix to each volume, containing short tracts upon 
such subjects as appeared necessary to form a connected view of the laws of Virginia, as a 
member of the federal union (Philadelphia: Robert Carr printer, 1803), 198; State v Joiner 
11 N.C. 250 (N.C. 1826) Supreme Court of North Carolina.
14 Ibid.
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child was still alive and crying when he found it in the woods. Therefore, 
the child was shown to have been born alive and the prosecution only had 
to prove that Charity inflicted harm on her daughter by abandoning her, 
resulting in her death that night.15 Similarly, in State v Hannah Walker, 
evidence gathered from a midwife’s testimony established that the child 
was born alive.16 However, in most instances, proving the child’s live birth 
was a difficult step. If the prosecution failed to meet this standard, they 
would no longer have a case and the mother would be acquitted.17
When undertaking this vital step in infanticide cases, the prosecution 
had to prove that the child was born alive by demonstrating its capacity to 
“maintain a separate existence” from his mother.18 This was done by using 
medical evidence collected at the jury of inquests. 19 The jurors and coroners 
usually did not collect medical evidence themselves, relying on women in 
the community, typically midwives and friends of the defendants, to do 
so. These women often appeared in court to prove that the child was born 
alive, making women crucial to the legal processes surrounding infanticide.
For example, in State v Jefferies, the prosecution used four women’s 
testimonies to prove this point. Sarah Jefferies, like most women who 
appeared in the court for this crime, had concealed her pregnancy and 
had allegedly killed her child in secret.20 A woman, Montgomery, stated 
that Mrs. Foller, a friend of hers, had requested that she accompany Mrs. 
Foller to Fanny Jefferies’s house. When she arrived at the house, she saw 
“sufficient signs” that a child had recently been born there. Montgomery did 
not relay to the jury of inquest what those signs were, and the court did not 
15 State v Charity (a slave), September 2, 1830, Orange County Miscellaneous Records, 
NCDA H.
16 State v Hannah Walker, November 25, 1821 Orange County Criminal Action Papers 
1820-1821, CR 073 326.20, folder labeled: 1821, NCDA H, testimony of Pegg y Perr y, the 
midwife.
17 A lfred Swaine Taylor, The Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. 
(Philadelphia: H.C. Lea’s Son and company, 1883), 317.
18 Ibid.,
19 In all infanticide cases, a jur y of inquest, comprised of 12 men, went to the domicile where 
the mother resided to examine the child after the coroner had been informed that a person 
had died under unusual circumstances. However, because the coroner had to be informed 
of the incident, the inquest sometimes did not examine the child until many days after 
the discover y of the body. This procedural issue could present a host of problems for the 
prosecution. For example, in State v Charity, the coroner was not informed and did not 
summon a jur y of inquest to examine the infant until af ter it had already been buried. 
Therefore, the coroner had to exhume the remains to conduct an examination, which 
potentially altered the result of the coroner’s examination.
20 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, 
testimony of Mrs. Horton.
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ask her to elaborate.21 The courts valued women’s voices in infanticide cases 
to the point that their opinions were submitted as irrefutable evidence. 
This was true for both the defense and the prosecution. The defense did 
not cross-examine Montgomery to ask her what those signs were to test 
her expertise on the subject. That the prosecution and the defense counsel 
chose not to question the women on their medical knowledge demonstrates 
the centrality of women in this field of knowledge. Though women often 
occupied the political margins of southern society in the nineteenth 
century and rarely testified in court cases, infanticide cases represented 
one place in which they could take center stage.22
Beyond the condition of the child, the period of gestation and age of 
the child when it died was an additional factor considered in infanticide 
cases. In State v Jeffries, Montgomery said that she went back a few days 
later to see Sarah’s child. Reports had circulated that Sarah had recently 
given birth, even though on numerous occasions Sarah had dismissed this 
discussion as mere gossip. Montgomery stated that when she finally saw the 
child it had hair on its head and nails “so well grown as to project toward the 
ends of fingers.”23 In the nineteenth century, it was generally understood 
that once a child reached a certain age in the womb (generally six or seven 
months) it was fully capable of living outside of the womb because it had 
already developed the necessary organs to do so.24 Demonstrating this 
knowledge and working to prove that the child was old enough to survive 
outside its mother’s womb, Montgomery claimed that it was about seven 
months old and not younger than six months. She further claimed that 
she had seen “several children live and grow up not more advanced than 
this.”25 The prosecution used this testimony to show that the child was 
indeed viable and had the capacity to maintain a separate existence out of 
the mother’s womb.
Even if the prosecution proved that the child was “viable” and had 
the capacity to live outside the womb, they still had to show that the child 
21 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, the 
testimony of Mrs. Montgomer y.
22 Felicity Turner, Narrating Infanticide: Constructing the Modern Gendered State in 
Nineteenth-Century America (North Carolina: Duke University 2010), 21-22 .
23 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, 
testimony of Mrs. Montgomer y.
24 Taylor, The Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 312 .
25 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, 
testimony of Mrs. Montgomer y.
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was not stillborn, something that most women indicted for infanticide, 
including Sarah Jeffries, claimed. Considering the importance of proving 
the child’s viability and life when securing a guilty verdict, women tended 
to say that their child was stillborn. Jefferies was no anomaly: like most 
women, she denied that the child was born alive.26
In Jefferies’s case, the state could establish that the child had developed 
enough to function on its own. Once it had achieved this, the prosecution 
used the rest of Montgomery’s testimony to argue that the child was 
indeed born alive. While Jeffries had told Montgomery that the child was 
born dead, the witness asserted that it could not have been born dead by 
exclaiming, “No, it must have cried or the tongue could not have been 
[hanging] out [of its mouth].” This testimony was the lynchpin of the 
prosecution’s argument. The court accepted that if the child had cried, then 
it must have been born alive, thus providing the “strongest evidence of the 
child being born alive” by the most current standards of medical science of 
that time.27 Once the prosecution proved that the child had been born alive, 
the defense counsel had to call additional women to the stand to support 
Jefferies’s claim that the child had been stillborn.
One of these women, Patsy Barrot, stated that she had gone to Fanny 
Jefferies’s house three months prior to the child’s death, to visit Sarah, 
who “was not pregnant” at the time. Furthermore, Barrot stated that 
Jefferies “fell down with a pail of water and was badly bruised” the night 
before the prisoner had supposedly given birth, to argue that the child 
had been stillborn due to injury. The defense used this evidence to claim 
that the child was not old enough to be considered viable and was instead 
born prematurely due to an injury.28 Another witness, Franky Stephens, 
26 For additional cases where the defendants claimed that the infant was not born alive, 
see “Report of the tr ial of Susanna a colored woman,” June 1810, Schenectady New York, 
in Paul Finkelman, Free Blacks, Slaves, and Slaveowners in Civil and Criminal Courts 
(New York: Garland Publishing 1988), 211-260; State v Rianna Day, testimony of Rachel 
and Lucy March Term 1849, Orange County Criminal Action papers, NCDA H; and State 
v Elizabeth Crabtree September term 1821, Orange County criminal action papers, 
NCDA H; State v Sooky Bishop, March 1843, Orange County Criminal Action Papers 
1843-1844, NCDA H.
27 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, testimony 
of Mrs. Montgomer y. A lso see State v Sarah Jef fer ies, inquest of Mrs. Montgomer y, 
November 1819, Caswell Countr y Criminal Action Papers 1818-1820, folder labeled: 1818, 
North Carolina, NCDA H; Dean A mos, Principles of Medical Jurisprudence: designed for 
the profession of law and medicine (A lbany: Gould, Banks and Gould, 1850), 112 .
28 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, the 
testimony of Mrs. Patsy Barrot.
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supported Barrot’s testimony. Both Barrot and Stephens helped the defense 
prove that the child was underdeveloped. Like the state’s witnesses, the 
defense only called women to the stand in order to discuss the condition of 
the child and the prosecution did not cross-examine the female witnesses 
or question their knowledge of children and child birth. As witnesses, 
women were vital in every stage of the legal process.
Prosecutors proved in a vareity of ways that infants were born alive. 
Sometimes, the prosecution would examine the color of the lungs. If the 
lungs were of a lighter color, it was believed that the child had breathed 
before dying. Doctors would sometimes weigh the lungs, often using 
the popular hydrostic test, which required that the doctors submerge 
the lungs in water. If the lungs floated, then the child was assumed 
to have breathed and therefore had been born alive. However, tests 
like these were eventually abandoned when it was discovered that an 
infant’s lungs could sink even when it was known to have lived.29 Lack 
of advanced medical knowledge made it difficult to prove livebirth 
definitely, which may be why women’s own experiences with childbirth 
was given such credence.
In some cases, when viability could not be proven through witness 
testimony or an examination of the development of a child’s body, other 
indications could be helpful in securing a verdict. Visible wounds could 
suggest that the mother inflicted harm, which in turn proved the child’s 
viability. In State v Jefferies, Mrs. Horton testified that she was the first 
witness to see the child because she was the one that retrieved it. She told 
the court that when she saw the child, the “skull was mashed in and broken.” 
She added that the “ankle of one of the legs appeared to be broken.” It 
was in the wrong position and was “bruised, black and discolored.” The 
prosecution used this evidence to argue that some type of violence had 
been inflicted on the child, resulting in these injuries.30 The prosecution 
provided similar evidence in State v Charity, during which a coroner cut 
open a child’s head to find that the skull was “much fractured.” In such 
cases, courts saw wounds as proof that the mother had injured the child in a 
29 Taylor, The Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 323-385, 526.
30 State v Sarah Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell Countr y Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, 
testimony of Mrs. Horton.
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way that had caused its death.31
Sometimes the defense responded to such evidence by insisting 
that a child’s wounds came from birth itself. In the nineteenth century, 
childbirth was dangerous for both mothers and children. Infant mortality 
ran high, especially among enslaved people who had less access to medical 
care or supplies. Furthermore, the harsh treatments endured by enslaved 
women led to increased child mortality rates and poorer health overall. 
Enslaved women at times continued to work until their pregnancy no 
longer permitted them to do so, and they did not receive the necessary 
nutrients to ensure that they would give birth to a healthy child.32 Bruising, 
broken bones, or general poor appearance were thus often blamed on the 
conditions of childbirth. Therefore, the defense argued that many infants 
died from natural occurrences outside their mothers’ control.
When marks of violence were not as visible, the prosecution would ask 
witnesses to speak on the mother’s character and behavior in an attempt 
to demonstrate the potential for such violence.33 In Sarah Jefferies’s case, a 
witness by the name of Elizabeth Foller was called to testify on behalf of the 
state. She stated that Jefferies had come to her house a few days before the 
child was discovered. Jefferies told Foller and her husband that she knew 
that there were rumors alleging that she was pregnant. She further stated 
that those people were wrong, that she “would disappoint them,” and that if 
she did have another child, “nobody should ever know it.” The prosecution 
used this evidence to prove intent rather than physical conditions.34 
Similarly, the prosecution argued that the defendants’ contradictory 
answers proved her guilt. Jefferies at first denied having a child, only to 
later admit that it was “useless to deny it.” Montgomery noted that Jeffries 
had given different answers about the age of her child and had left the house 
in tears. The prosecutors used this portion of Montgomery’s testimony to 
argue that Sarah Jefferies was guilty of murdering her child. Her deceitful 
31 State v Charity , September 2, 1830., Orange County Slave Records no date, 1783-1865 
broken series, CR 073.928.8, folder labeled: 1825-1841 (Broken series), Orange County 
Miscellaneous Records, NCDA H, testimony of Thomas Haddis. Haddis was the North 
Carolina state coroner from x to y.
32 Schwartz, Birthing A Slave, 135, 153, 207.
33 Finkelman, “Report of the tr ial of Susanna a colored woman,” 221 (page 11 of the report), 
district attorney’s address to the court, 217 (page 7 of the report) the indictment.
34 State v Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell County Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, testimony 
of Elizabeth Foller.
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nature, they insisted, was proof that she had tried to cover up her crime.35
In bringing character witnesses, examining physical wounds, and 
accusing women of deceit, prosecutors tried to convince juries that 
defendants fell short of their motherly responsibilities. According to Mrs. 
Horton’s testimony, Jefferies’s dead infant had a “very dirty look as if it 
had been buried,” with clay on its back and hips, and ants “running over 
it.” Sarah’s actions ran contrary to southern expectations of women as 
caretakers. The prosecution insisted that the defendant’s supposed lack 
of morality and unpleasant personality indicated that she had killed her 
child. In State v Charity, the prosecution similarly used the inhumane 
and unusual burial site as evidence that the mother had killed her child. 
This argument was used by many prosecutors in nineteenth-century 
North Carolina. If the court decided that an infant had been inhumanely 
disposed of, it was indicative of the inhumanity of the mother and that 
she was capable of murder.36
When no dead body was discovered, the prosecution focused solely 
on the mother’s behavior to prove that the mother killed the child. In State 
v Patience Rye, the defendant—a single white woman from Richmond 
County, North Carolina—was indicted for infanticide even though the 
court was never provided with the child’s body. During the trial, the 
prosecution first established through testimonies that Rye had a child, then 
listed the “circumstances to prove” that Rye was the murderer, most of 
which focused on her abnormal behavior. As proof of guilt, the prosecution 
stated that Rye “refused the company of her daughter” when she gave birth 
to her child, gave “contradictory answers,” and knew she was about to give 
birth. Even when the prosecution could not prove that the child was born 
alive by actually examining the child or through eyewitness accounts, the 
state attempted to establish guilt through the mother’s actions and moral 
character.37 The defense often responded to the prosecution’s accusations 
by showing that a woman’s concealment of her dead infant was justifiable. 
Sarah Jefferies admitted that she had given birth to a child. When someone 
35 State v Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell County Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, testimony 
of Mrs. Montgomer y.
36 State v Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell County Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, testimony 
of Mrs. Horton; State v Charity, September 1830, Orange County Superior Court Minute 
Docket, September 1830, NCDA H.
37 State v Patience Rye, September 1808, Criminal Action Papers 1806-1809 R ichmond 
County, North Carolina CR 082 .326.4, folder labeled: 1808, NCDA H.
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asked why she did not let her “circumstance be made known” to everyone 
else, she stated that she was afraid because her mother had “made some 
threats about having another child.”38
Why were jurors so reluctant to convict women when the evidence was 
so compelling? Two infanticide cases, in which the defendants were initially 
found guilty but were pardoned or retried and later found not guilty, can help 
explain this paradox. The two cases demonstrate that jurors were influenced 
by factors beyond legal guidelines in making their decision to acquit women, 
focusing instead on factors pertaining to gender, race, and slavery.
The Public Weighs In
Even when women were found guilty of infanticide, the courts sometimes 
spared their lives due to pressure from the public. For example, the 
defense counsel in State v Charity failed to meet the standard of justifiable 
concealment and the court found her guilty of infanticide, a felony 
punishable by death.39 The court ordered that on October 15, 1830, the 
county’s sheriff was to transport Charity to the place of execution, where 
38 State v Jef fer ies, May 1819, Caswell County Minute Docket Superior Court, NCDA H.
39 State v Charity, September 1830, Orange County Minute Superior Docket, NCDA H, 110.
Even when pregnant, enslaved women were forced to work on plantations in the South, which 
contributed to the high infant mortality rates among enslaved populations in the 
antebellum era. (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress).
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she was “to be hanged by the neck until she be dead.” 40 David Craig, 
Charity’s master, was present at the proceeding and requested an appeal 
in the North Carolina Supreme Court upon hearing that his slave had been 
condemned to death.
Before the verdict had been issued and before the court hearing was 
concluded, the presiding judge had denied Craig the opportunity to testify 
in court. According to the judge, with the prosecution concurring, the 
master of the slave had a “direct interest” in the slave and the court decision. 
The master was likely to mold his statement to ensure his slave’s liberation. 
Therefore, since the defense counsel was not permitted to present Craig as a 
witness, they objected to the use of Craig for the prosecution, declaring that 
the “master was unwilling and could not be compelled to give testimony.”41
Upon receiving Craig’s petition, however, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court issued a writ that overruled the lower court. Judge Ruffin of the 
Supreme Court stated that since the rights of the slave and the master are 
woven and interconnected it was impossible to “restore him his property, 
without yielding her another trial for her life.” The court ultimately decided 
to comply with the master’s wishes and grant Charity a new trial “because 
of the improper admission of the evidence of the master being over ruled.” 
Craig was then examined as a witness for the new trial. On Thursday, 
March 17, 1831, the Superior Court returned a new verdict and found 
Charity “not guilty.”42
Charity was originally found guilty of infanticide. However, after David 
Craig gave his testimony, the jurors changed their minds. Craig’s testimony 
was the only difference between the two trials: the other witnesses’ 
testimonies remained the same. Furthermore, Craig did not offer any new 
evidence. The women who testified had established that the child was born 
alive and believed that the child “appeared that it might live.” What was it 
about Craig’s testimony that influenced the jurors to change their mind? 
The most likely answer is that the jurors wanted to please Craig, the master. 
The only new evidence presented to the jurors in the new trial was the 
master’s displeasure with the original verdict.43
40 Ibid.
41 State v Charity, September 1830, Orange County Superior Court Minute Docket, NCDA H.
42 State v Charity 13. N.C. 543 (N.C. 1830)
43 State v Charity (a slave), September 02, 1830, Orange County Slave Records no date, 
1783-1865, CR 073.928.8, folder labeled: 1825-1841 (Broken series), Orange County 
Miscellaneous Records, NCDA H, testimony of Polly Chuck.
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These courts’ juries consisted of only men, who might have 
sympathized with Craig’s situation, especially since Charity was his only 
slave. The jury also might have changed its verdict in order to support the 
foundation of the slave system. In State v Mann, a case that was argued in 
North Carolina’s Supreme Court a year before Charity’s case, the judge 
ruled that North Carolina courts were “compelled to express an opinion 
upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave in North 
Carolina.” Judge Ruffin continued by stating that “the end is the profit of 
the master” and that “this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as 
property; to the security of the master, and the public tranquility, greatly 
dependent upon their subordination.”44 The Supreme Court essentially 
ruled that a master’s desires and security should be the court’s priority. 
Charity’s new trial’s decision is evidence of the impact of that ruling.
State v Jefferies also resulted in a pardon following an initial guilty 
verdict. The defense counsel moved for a new trial because “the evidence 
proved, if the child had been killed by the mother, the manner of the death 
was different from that charged in the indictment, and was produced by 
blows, and not by choaking and strangling.” The North Carolina Supreme 
Court overruled the defense’s reasoning and upheld the superior court’s 
decision. Jefferies was placed in jail to await her execution date.45
In March 1820, individuals in the community petitioned the governor 
to pardon Sarah Jefferies. Much like the treatment of Charity’s case, the 
people’s reasoning had nothing to do with the infanticide law or legal 
burdens of proof, but instead focused on the mother’s character. The jurors 
who had convicted Jefferies formed an initial petition to the governor. They 
stated “that the child of the said Sarah was not born alive, that if it had been, 
she was too affectionate of a mother to have offered violence for it herself.” 
Another petition, which was signed by 37 additional North Carolinians, 
claimed that the “verdict was contrary to evidence.” The prisoner had 
given birth to many children before and “they have no death.” They further 
stated that their confidence was strengthened by the “dying declaration 
of the prisoner, made since her trial and at a time, when in sickness,” she 
believed that she was going to die.46 The individuals in these petitions did 
44 State v Mann 13 N.C. 263 (N.C. 1829).
45 State v Jef fer ies 7 N.C. 480 (N.C. 1819).
46 Governor’s Papers, volume 49.3, John Branch, Februar y 8–November 28, petit ions on 
page 500-501, 513-514, NCDA H.
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not attempt to obtain a pardon for Sarah 
Jefferies by showing that the prosecution 
failed to meet the three standards needed to 
convict the mother of infanticide. Instead, 
they pressured the governor to pardon 
Jefferies because they believed that she was 
an affectionate and nurturing mother who 
could not have killed her child. Because the 
southern public believed that infanticide was 
only practiced by unfit mothers, evidence of a 
mother being nurturing and caring could result 
in public support through such petitions for 
pardons, which sought to preserve the southern 
definition of a true woman and mother.
In another petition, a man by the name 
of A.D. Murphey suggested “that there was 
no satisfactory proof that the child was born 
alive.” He argued that the jury formed its decision based on the “opinions” 
of some women, which were “matter[s] of presumption and the contrary 
presumption appeared to me to be the strongest.” Murphey continued by 
stating that Sarah Jefferies “has literally become a subject of pity” who had 
“suffered in prison” with “waning” health. Murphey and the other jurors 
claimed that by keeping Jeffries imprisoned, the governor was denying her 
the time she could be spending with her family, all of whom were “dependent 
upon her labor for support.”47 Yet again, gendered societal expectations of 
women and mothers influenced public responses to infanticide verdicts. 
These petitions pressured Governor John Branch to pardon the women, 
not because the community believed she was innocent, but because they 
wanted the governor to uphold southern values and customs. Jefferies’s 
advocates believed that if a woman conformed to gendered expectations by 
embodying her maternal role and being an affectionate mother, she should 
not be punished.48 On May 19, 1820, John Branch stated that “for satisfactory 
reasons” he pardoned Sarah Jefferies, and he commanded Caswell County 
47 Governor’s Papers, volume 49.3, John Branch, Februar y 8–November 28, petit ions on 
pages 356-357, NCDA H.
48 Ibid.
Thomas Ruffin served as the chief 
justice of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court from 1833 to 1852. 
Ruffin issued North Carolina 
Supreme Court rulings that 
allowed masters to testify on the 
behalf of their slave, because “the 
end is the profit of the master.” 
(Photo courtesy of the North 
Carolina Museum of History.)
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to notice this pardon and act accordingly.49
While the burden of proof for so many infanticide cases lay heavily 
on the prosecution, the role of female witnesses and the lack of strong 
medical knowledge of childbirth permitted many prosecutions to “prove” 
that the accused women were guilty. Paradoxically, this proof relied both 
on society’s acceptance of women’s incontrovertible knowledge in the 
realm of childbirth and also on social perceptions of female immorality, 
often compounded by racial and economic perceptions. However, by 
relying on this very perception, other southern community members 
were able to overcome initial court decisions in order to save the 
lives of accused mothers.
Restoring Order
Nineteenth-century North Carolina courts had to meet certain standards 
to prove that a mother was guilty of infanticide. However, even when the 
prosecution met prescribed legal standards, jurors remained reluctant 
to convict mothers. Factors outside of the law pressured jurors to acquit 
women for this crime. In The People and Their Peace, Laura Edwards 
argues that the southern courts’ “point was to restore order” and not 
necessarily to protect individual rights.50 As demonstrated by Charity’s 
and Sarah Jefferies’s cases, the court maintained order by reinforcing the 
slave system, the patriarchal system, and the southern idea of motherhood 
and womanhood.
Southern courts vindicated women in order to support their regional 
beliefs and customs. In the nineteenth century, abolitionists, pro-slavery 
activists, and politicians from across the nation reported infanticide cases in 
a way that promoted their principles, whether that was slavery, patriarchy, 
or the definition of a true southern woman. In this way, the courts’ decisions 
supported American culture. In the cases examined here, North Carolina 
courts upheld southern culture. Infanticide cases were used to reinforce 
southern notions of gender, race, and slavery. Cases of infanticide shed light 
on how these systems and social constructs were so deeply embedded in 
the South that they influenced law during the mid-nineteenth century.
49 John Branch, Governor’s Letter Book 1817-1820, volume 23.2 (May 19, 1820), 301 NCDA H.
50 Laura Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of 
Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009), 102-103.
